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This study sought to answer the question, “Is there an association between quality 
rating performance on Nursing Home Compare (NHC) and financial performance in 
nursing homes?” A quantitative, non-experimental study involving archival data was 
conducted using data from Medicare Cost Reports and Nursing Home Compare. The 
sample included CMS-certified, freestanding skilled nursing facilities in the United States 
that participated in NHC from 2009-2011 and submitted Medicare Cost Reports from 
2010-2012. There were 14,015 nursing homes in 2010; 14,139 nursing homes in 2011; 
and 14,265 nursing homes included in 2012. Data was analyzed with generalized linear 
models using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 22 (SPSS). The results of 
this study indicated that high quality was correlated to lower operating expenses, higher 
occupancy (over the latter two years of the study), private payor census and higher 
Medicare census. This study did not find that high quality was associated with higher 
operating profit margins. Despite the limitations of this study, the results provide 
important implications for nursing home operators and policymakers. 
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Introduction 
Quality Concerns in Nursing Homes 
Poor quality of care in nursing homes has been a concern in the United States for 
decades (Institute of Medicine, 1986; Wunderlich & Kohler, 2000). Findings of a study 
conducted by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) in 1986 revealed that nursing home 
residents were receiving inadequate care, and experiencing abuse and neglect. With a 
number of suggested and later adopted recommendations for reform, the IOM’s study led 
to the passage of the Nursing Home Reform Act of 1987 as part of the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act (OBRA). Regulatory controls, including resident assessments, data 
collection, a Medicare/Medicaid certification process, and unannounced surveys, were 
mandated to monitor compliance with the OBRA requirements (Institute of Medicine, 
1986). A subsequent report by the IOM in 2000 revealed that while there had been some 
improvement, quality of care concerns still existed (Wunderlich & Kohler, 2000).  
Evolution of Nursing Home Report Cards and Nursing Home Compare 
In October 1998, the Health Care Financing Administration (later renamed the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services) introduced Nursing Home Compare 
(www.medicare.gov/NursingHomeCompare), an online nursing home report card. For the 
first time, reporting of nursing home quality information on NHC became mandatory for 
all 15,000+ nursing homes participating in Medicare and Medicaid (Grabowski & Town, 
2011). The goal of the website was to control market forces to encourage poorly 
performing homes to improve quality or to face penalties, including closure of the facility 
to future admissions (US General Accounting Office, 2002).  
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Although it was not widely known or utilized by the public, NHC provided 
information on basic quality and facility characteristics. Initially, the quality component 
was limited to reports of health-related deficiencies. Facility characteristics included 
number of beds, type of ownership and location. Over the next two decades, there were 
several expansions of the data posted on NHC and enhancements to the formatting and 
user interface (Grabowski & Town, 2011).  
Table 1 details the evolution of nursing home report cards and NHC. In June 
2000, nurse staffing and nurse aide information were added to NHC. In November 2002, 
the national launch of the Nursing Home Quality Initiative (NHQI) further expanded the 
original report cards to include long- and short-stay quality measures (QM’s) to NHC. 
The QM’s were derived from resident-level assessment data from the Minimum Data Set 
(MDS) 2.0. The MDS is a physical, psychological and psychosocial functioning 
assessment and care-planning tool that is used to collect uniform information on all 
residents in Medicare- or Medicaid-certified nursing homes. These assessments are self-
reported by nursing homes and transmitted electronically to CMS through state databases 
(Harris & Clauser, 2002). In January 2004 the list of QM’s was overhauled, followed by 
an additional update in November 2004 (Grabowski & Town, 2011).  
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Table 1: Evolution of Nursing Home Report Cards 
   
Date Nursing Home Compare Progression Web Site Content Changes 
October 1998 Introduction of NHC Facility characteristics 
Health-related deficiencies 
June 2000 Staffing measures added Nurse Staffing 
Nurse Aide Information 
April 2002 Nursing Home Quality Initiative 
(NHQI) piloted in six states 
Quality Measures: 
• Activities of Daily Living  
• Delirium 




• Physical Restraints 
• Pressure Ulcers 
November 2002 National launch of NHQI,  
NHC made public 
1 Quality Measure eliminated:  
• Weight Loss 
January 2004 Overhaul of Quality Measures used in 
NHC 
List of Quality Measures: 







• Pain (long-stay) 
• Pain (short-stay) 
• Physical Restraints 
• Pressure Ulcers (high risk) 
• Pressure Ulcers (low risk) 
• Urinary Tract Infections 
• Weight Loss 
 
Nursing Home Compare: Five Star Quality Rating System  
 In December 2008, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
enhanced the NHC website with the addition of the Five-Star Quality Rating System. The 
primary purpose of the enhancement was to provide residents and their families with an 
easy way to understand assessment of nursing home quality and provide them with 
relevant information to distinguish between high and low performing nursing homes (Abt 
Associates Inc., 2014). Increased usefulness and utilization were anticipated after 
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improvements to the website, which offered consumers the ability to search and sort on 
meaningful characteristics, to make better comparisons between nursing homes, to utilize 
Google maps for directions, and to optimize the printing of information from the website 
(CMS, 2008).  
Each nursing home’s performance is rated on four measures of quality: 1) health 
inspections survey results; 2) staffing levels; 3) a set of QM’s derived from the MDS; and 
4) the overall quality rating, generated as a composite of the other three ratings (Abt 
Associates Inc., 2014). For each of the four report card ratings, the key for performance 
ratings is between 1 to 5 stars, where 1 star indicates poor performance and 5 stars 
indicate highest performance (CMS, 2008). Table 2 explains the star rating further. 
Table 2 Nursing Home Compare Five-Star Quality Rating System 
  
Number of Stars Quality Comparison 
★ Much below average 
★★ Below average 
★★★ Average 
★★★★ Above average 
★★★★★ Much above average 
 
Health Inspections Rating. The health inspections rating is based on the number, 
scope and severity of deficiencies a nursing home received during the three most recent 
annual health inspection surveys, any complaint investigations within the recent 36 
months of the rating date and the number of visits required to restore compliance after 
deficiencies were discovered. The rating is derived using a point system where points are 
assigned to each observed health deficiencies and more points are assigned to more 
serious, widespread deficiencies. Updated monthly, the rating reflects the relative 
performance of nursing homes within a state. Only the top 10% of nursing homes in each 
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state receive a five-star rating for health inspections (Abt Associates Inc., 2014; CMS, 
2008).  
Staffing Rating. At the request of Congress, a study was completed by the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) on nurse staffing. It was found that 
97% of nursing homes provided inadequate daily nurse staffing, and nursing homes 
needed at least 4.1 nursing hours per resident to provide quality care (CMS, 2001). As a 
result of this study, nurse staffing levels were integrated into the Five-Star Quality Rating 
System on NHC in 2008, approximately 7 years later. The staffing rating is based on the 
number of registered nurse hours and total nursing hours (including registered nurses, 
licensed practical nurses, licensed vocational nurses and certified nurse aides) per 
resident day. To receive five stars for the staffing rating, a nursing home must meet the 
minimum nurse staff level of 4.1 hours per resident per day (Kaiser, 2013). The staffing 
rating compares staffing levels with freestanding nursing homes across the nation and is 
adjusted for resident case-mix using MDS data (i.e. resident care needs). The staffing 
rating is usually updated annually on NHC (Abt Associates Inc., 2014; CMS, 2008).  
Quality Measures Rating. As the enhanced quality component of NHC report 
cards, the quality measures (QM) rating was updated to include nine total quality 
indicators/measures from the MDS in June 2012: seven long-stay measures and two 
short-stay measures, detailed specifically in Table 3. 
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Table 3 Short- and Long-Stay Quality Measures in the  
Five-Star Quality Rating System 
  
Short- or Long- Stay Quality Measures 
Short-Stay Quality Measures Delirium 
Pain 




Pressure Ulcers (high risk) 
Pressure Ulcers (low risk) 
Urinary Tract Infections 
 
The QM rating is derived by a point system where each measure is assigned 20 to 100 
points, based on nursing home performance. All nursing homes are grouped into quintiles 
based on the distribution of the QM’s. For all QM’s except for the physical restraints and 
short-stay pressure ulcers, those nursing homes in the bottom quintile are assigned 20 
points and those in the highest performing nursing homes are assigned 100 points. The 
physical restraint and short-stay pressure ulcer QM’s are assigned points differently, 
because they have low prevalence in nursing homes. For the restraint QM, nursing homes 
can achieve 100 points for the highest performance (zero percent rates). The remaining 
nursing homes are divided into two groups based on performance, where the better 
performers are assigned 60 points and the poorer performers are assigned 20 points. For 
the short-stay pressure ulcer QM, nursing homes can achieve 100 points for the highest 
performance (zero percent rates). The remaining nursing homes are divided into three 
groups based on performance, and 75, 50, or 20 points are assigned according to where 
each nursing home falls in the distribution. The quintiles used for scoring are generated 
from the national distribution of nursing homes for all of the QM’s except for the 
activities of daily living measure, for which the quintile is set for each state using the 
state distribution to account for differences in state Medicaid policies that appear to 
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impact this measure. Each of the nine QM’s is given equal weight, and the summation of 
all QM’s is used to generate a total score for each nursing home between 220 and 1100 
points. Cut points then used to assign one to five stars based on the distribution of total 
scores for each nursing home. 
The QM rating is usually updated quarterly on NHC, although the QM rating was 
held constant from March 2011 to July 2012 after the transition of MDS 2.0 to MDS 3.0 
in October 2010 (CMS, 2008). The upgrade of MDS 2.0 to MDS 3.0 improved the 
reliability, accuracy and usefulness of the assessment tool by including direct resident 
interviews and addressing concerns about the structure and length of the tool (Saliba & 
Buchanan, 2008). 
Overall Quality Rating. The overall quality rating is computed using the star 
ratings of the other three domains: health inspections, staffing and quality measures. The 
methodology for calculating the overall quality rating does not assign individual weights 
to the ratings, but the health inspection rating is the most heavily weighted and typically 
the most critical element as it is indicative of ongoing quality problems, if present (Abt 
Associates Inc., 2014). Table 4 explains the methodology used for calculating the overall 
quality rating. Depending on a nursing home’s performance on the staffing and QM 
domains, the overall quality rating may be up to two stars higher or lower than a facility’s 
health inspections rating. The overall quality rating is updated monthly on NHC (CMS, 
2008). 
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Table 4: Methodology for Calculating the Overall Quality Rating in the  
Five-Star Quality Rating System on Nursing Home Compare 
  
Steps Computation 
1 Start with Health Inspections rating (1 to 5 stars) 
2 Add 1 star if Staffing rating is 4 or 5 stars 
Subtract 1 star if Staffing rating is 1 
3 Add 1 star if Quality Measures rating is 5 stars 
Subtract 1 star if Quality Measures rating is 1 
4 If Health Inspections rating is 1 star, Overall Quality rating cannot be more than 2 stars 
5 If provider is a Special Focus Facility, Overall Quality rating cannot be more than 3 stars 
 
Affordable Care Act and Nursing Home Compare 
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) is the first comprehensive act of legislation since 
the Nursing Home Reform Act to expand quality of care-related requirements and 
improve federal and state oversight and enforcement of nursing home regulations. The 
ACA includes the Nursing Home Transparency and Improvement Act of 2009 that was 
passed to improve nursing home transparency and accountability by eliminating barriers 
in the regulation of Medicare and Medicaid-certified nursing homes. To strengthen 
regulators’ ability to hold providers accountable for compliance with federal 
requirements, provisions were passed with stricter requirements for ownership and 
financial relationship disclosure, mandatory accuracy in nurse staffing reports, and 
expanding the publicly available information on NHC (Kaiser, 2013).  
Most ACA-driven improvements to NHC and the Five-Star Quality Rating 
System were implemented in April 2011, but the website was redesigned in July 2012. 
The ACA led to the following requirements: 
1. Reporting of auditable staffing data showing daily hours of direct are and 
staff turnover/tenure 
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2. A standardized voluntary complaint form and education for consumers 
wanting to make a complaint 
3. A summary of the outcomes of complaint surveys and information on 
crimes committed by facilities, employees, and/or affiliates and 
corresponding civil monetary penalties 
4. Links to state websites with complete survey and investigation reports 
(CMS Form-2567), plans of correction, and education for consumers on 
interpreting the findings 
5. Distinguish Special Focus Facilities (SFF) on NHC for facilities with a 
history of substantially failing to comply with CMS quality of care 
requirements 
Utilization of Nursing Home Compare by Consumers and Providers 
CMS intended to increase the usefulness of the CMS Nursing Home Compare 
website to consumers, family members, and the general public (CMS, 2008). Data 
expansions and website enhancements have led to increased utilization of NHC over the 
years (Grabowski & Town, 2011; Office of Inspector General, 2004). Before the media 
campaign and launch of quality measures on NHC as part of the NHQI in 2002, NHC 
averaged fewer than 100,000 visits per month. In November 2002, NHC averaged about 
400,000 visits (Office of Inspector General, 2004). In December 2008, after the 
implementation of the Five-Star Quality Rating System, NHC averaged 1.3 million page 
views per month (CMS, 2008).  
There have been few studies to determine whether the increased traffic on NHC is 
due to increased utilization by hospital case managers that make referrals for hospital 
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patients needing nursing home placement or residents or their family members when 
choosing a nursing home. A study published in 2004 found that 38% of hospital 
discharge planners used the Nursing Home Compare website as part of their discharge 
planning (BearingPoint, 2004). In 2009, a study was completed with a small sample of 
4,754 family members to determine whether consumers utilized NHC and understood the 
results. It was found that 31% of consumers used the Internet to choose a nursing home. 
Of those in the sample, 12% used NHC and indicated a good understanding of the 
website’s content (Castle, 2009).  
Heightened awareness and utilization are also evident amongst providers. CMS 
sponsored a survey of nursing homes in the NHQI pilot states and found that 88% of 
facilities had familiarity with NHC (KPMG Consulting, 2003). In a similar survey across 
four states, it was found that 90% of the administrators had visited NHC (Castle, 2005). 
In a study published in 2007, a sample of nursing home administrators were interviewed 
regarding their initial reaction to the publication of nursing home report cards. Of the 724 
administrators included in the study, 69% reported reviewing their quality scores 
regularly and many had taken specific actions to improve quality (Mukamel, Spector, 
Zinn, Huang, Weimer & Dozier, 2007).  
Public report cards may be utilized more by consumers when selecting a provider 
in the nursing home setting than consumers looking for a physician, health plan or 
hospital (Werner, Stuart & Polsky, 2010). A 2008 poll from the Henry J. Kaiser Family 
Foundation found that 30% of Americans reviewed quality information to compare health 
plans, hospitals or doctor. Of the 30% that reviewed the quality information, only 14% 
reported utilizing it (Health Policy Brief, 2012). This may be due to the fact that nursing 
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home decisions are usually made under considerable time limits and pressure, such as 
during an inpatient stay in a hospital. While it may not be feasible for hospital patients or 
distressed family members to tour facilities or speak with nursing home staff, they can 
explore the Internet for quality information and comparisons (Castle, Diesel, & Ferguson-
Rome, 2010).  
Nursing Home Compare as a Policy 
The ultimate policy goal of publicly reported quality information is to improve 
quality of care (Grabowski & Town, 2011). NHC aims to improve quality of care in two 
ways: by increasing consumer demand for high-quality care; and incentivizing providers 
to compete on quality of care. By utilizing NHC when choosing a nursing home, 
consumers will have information to guide their selection of one with high-quality ratings. 
This may result in increased consumer demand for high-quality care and motivate 
providers to compete for high performance ratings and differentiate themselves from 
competitors (Werner, Stuart & Polsky, 2010). “Thus, in theory, [NHC] might be an 
effective policy tool to promote high-quality care” (Park, Konetzka & Werner, 2011).  
Contribution 
This study sought to answer the question, “Is there an association between quality 
rating performance on Nursing Home Compare and financial performance in nursing 
homes?” The central research question was tested using the following hypothesis tests: 
H1: Nursing homes with higher quality ratings will report higher net resident 
revenues than those with lower quality ratings. 
H2: Nursing homes with higher quality ratings will report lower total operating 
expenses than those with lower quality ratings. 
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H3: Nursing homes with higher quality ratings will report higher operating profit 
margins than those with lower quality ratings. 
H4: Nursing homes with higher quality ratings will report higher occupancy than 
those with lower quality ratings. 
H5: Nursing homes with higher quality ratings will report higher private payor 
census than those with lower quality ratings. 
H6: Nursing homes with higher quality ratings will report higher Medicare census 
than those with lower quality ratings. 
The population for this study included all CMS-certified, freestanding skilled nursing 
facilities that consistently participated in NHC from 2009-2010 and submitted Medicare 
Cost Reports from 2010-2012. 
 The findings of this study provide a solid critique of the effectiveness of NHC as 
a policy tool in driving quality and safety as a function of local market share. The long-
term effectiveness and sustainability of NHC as a policy tool to improve the quality and 
safety of care will depend on ongoing efforts by nursing home operators to achieve and 
maintain high quality of care in the face of diminishing resources. Sustaining a quality 
improvement program can be costly for nursing homes that are already challenged 
financially through slim operating margins. With evidence that high-quality ratings also 
yield improvements in financial performance and market share, operators will have 
additional incentive to continue to invest in quality improvement programs. 
To further the research that currently exists on NHC and financial performance, 
this study explored trends in NHC performance, including nursing homes’ financial 
performance since the introduction of the Five-Star Quality Rating System in 2008. 
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While there are several studies dating back to the inception of NHC that support the 
effectiveness of the report card as a policy tool that drives quality of care, it is currently 
unclear if NHC yields provider incentives. Several studies have reported contrasting 
findings on whether NHC and improved quality of care have led to increases in 
competition, occupancy, market share and/or improved financial performance.  
The literature on this topic is primarily limited to early studies focusing on data 
from the first 2-4 years after the implementation of NHC. Few studies use data from the 
last decade and the majority are meta-analyses comparing nursing home market share 
and/or occupancy rate pre- and post-NHC implementation which precluded adjustment 
for known confounding factors (e.g., regional variations in staffing and local competition 
for private pay residents). While some studies have included financial performance as an 
outcome, no current study has sought to empirically evaluate Nursing Home Compare 
data and financial performance using all available data. This study is unique in that it 
includes all Nursing Home Compare data since the implementation of the Five-Star 
Quality Rating System as well as nursing home financial performance data while 
adjusting for potential confounders. In examining the overall quality rating, this analysis 
includes a more comprehensive definition of quality than previous studies. The overall 
quality rating consists of facility-level, risk-adjusted structural quality indicators (nursing 
home staffing), process quality indicators (health inspections and select quality 
measures), and outcomes quality indicators (select quality measures). 
Literature Review 
The relationship between quality of care and financial performance in nursing 
homes is not obvious (Encinosa & Bernard, 2005). It is important to explore this 
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relationship because financial trouble may disrupt resident care or lead to nursing home 
closure. Nursing home closures may jeopardize access and availability of nursing home 
services to residents (Castle, 2005). The literature is limited and mixed on the quality-
financial performance relationship. In order to provide a thorough literature review on the 
relationship between quality and financial performance, this review examines trends in 
nursing home quality, revenues, costs, profit, market share, occupancy and payor mix 
under public reporting. This review draws from relevant peer-reviewed articles and 
popular nursing home advocacy and consulting organizations. Standard search strategies 
were used involving the querying of two online databases, MEDLINE and OVID, using 
keywords for articles since the implementation of NHC in 2002. The references from 
relevant articles were also reviewed. 
Quality 
Nursing home quality report cards were launched as an initiative to improve the 
quality of care in nursing homes. The intent was to make quality information accessible 
to prospective residents and increase the demand for quality, then in turn provide an 
incentive for nursing home operators to invest in quality improvement.  
According to Mukamel et al. (2008), there are three potential outcomes of nursing 
home report cards: 
1) changing consumers’ choice - a demand response;  
2) [incentivizing] providers to improve quality – a supply response; and  
3) improving overall quality levels – an equilibrium result. 
Several studies have been published analyzing trends in quality of care since the 
publication of nursing home report cards on Nursing Home Compare (NHC). While the 
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literature is mixed, but the majority of the studies show that public reporting has led to 
improved quality.  
Zinn et. al (2005) found positive trends in quality improvement after nursing 
home report cards were made public in 2002. Nine of ten published quality measures 
(QM’s) had improved significantly, but only three of the QM (pain control, use of 
physical restraints and rates of delirium) trends toward improvement were meaningful. In 
a similar study, Castle, Engberg, and Liu (2007) compared QM’s in 2003 to those in 2004 
(post-NHC) and found that eight of fourteen QM’s showed improvements in quality. 
However, the changes found from year to year were less than 1% for thirteen of the 
fourteen QM’s. Both studies were limited in that they only examined post-NHC data, 
rather than pre- and post-NHC data, which did not make it possible to attribute the results 
to NHC. 
In 2008, Mukamel et al. overcame that limitation using primary and secondary 
data from before and after NHC (2001-2003). It was concluded that NHC had an impact 
on some clinical quality measures, particularly among nursing homes that had reported 
initiating quality improvement in response to NHC. Results were based on five QM’s for 
a sample of post-acute care residents only. Of the five QM’s examined, two (restraint use 
and pain control) showed improvement following NHC’s publication in 2002. One 
limitation of this study was the fact that risk adjustment of QM’s on NHC was limited. 
Also, without a concurrent control group, it was difficult to attribute the findings to NHC.  
 Published a year after Mukamel et al.’s study, Werner et al. (2009) used data from 
1999-2005 and also found that quality of care improved at nursing homes on NHC for 
some QM’s. Although the findings aligned with prior empirical work, the methods 
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improved upon prior studies with the use of extensive controls for nursing home resident 
selection. Small nursing homes that were not required to report to NHC were used as a 
contemporaneous control, propensity score matching was used to ensure the similarity of 
the residents being compared, and only post-acute care residents were included in the 
sample. Post-acute care residents were analyzed as they tend to have higher turnover rates 
and are usually younger and less cognitively impaired, which makes it more likely to find 
an effect from report cards and easier to control for case mix severity. There were three 
reported and one unreported QM examined. Two of the three reported QM’s showed 
statistically significant improvement (pain and walking) with small magnitudes of 
change. The fourth unreported QM, rehospitalizations, did not show a significant 
improvement and, in some cases, worsened. Grabowski and Town published a similar 
study in 2011 using pre and post-NHC data, as well as a control group, but revealed 
conflicting results. Using the 6 pilot states with staggering NHQI introduction dates as 
the control group relative to other nursing homes in the US, no statistical evidence was 
found supporting the claim that NHC impacted overall quality of care.  
The American Health Care Association (AHCA) publishes an annual quality 
report with data compiled from all of its approximately 8,690 member facilities that care 
for approximately one million people. AHCA is the largest association of long-term and 
post-acute care providers in the United States and has a long-standing history of 
advocating for quality care and services for frail, elderly and disabled citizens. In 2012, 
AHCA reported that nursing home quality of care had improved nationwide in twelve of 
the fifteen QM’s reported on NHC from 2008-2012. The most significant improvements 
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were seen in post-acute care residents with 29% improvement in pressure ulcers and 12% 
improvement in pain (AHCA Quality Report, 2012).  
In addition to QM’s, AHCA also examines annual trends in quality of staffing and 
health inspections in nursing homes. The quality of staffing in nursing homes steadily 
increased in the amount of direct care nursing hours per resident for all nursing staff 
(RN’s, LPN’s, LVN’s, and CNA’s) from 2009 to 2013. The number of facilities with four 
or five stars in the staffing component of the Five-Star Quality Rating System steadily 
increased over the five years, from 38.3% in 2009 to 51.3% in 2013. Likewise, all of the 
measures for health inspections and regulatory compliance showed improvement from 
2009-2013. There was a steady decline in the average number of deficiencies cited and an 
overall downward trend for facilities cited with substandard quality of care or immediate 
jeopardy. The proportion of facilities with deficiency-free surveys increased over the 
five-year period, as well as those with five stars in overall quality. The percentage of 
facilities that received a rating of five stars in overall quality steadily increased from 
11.8% in 2009 to 19.6% in 2013 (AHCA Quality Report, 2013).  
Quality, Revenues and Expenses 
 Nursing homes achieve high financial performance through their ability to 
generate revenues and their ability to control expenses. With Medicare/Medicaid 
reimbursement cuts and increased competition due to the growing emergence of assisted 
living facilities and home health agencies, nursing homes are challenged to find strategies 
for increasing revenue. Under NHC, nursing homes may strive to achieve high-quality 
services as a product differentiation strategy to increase revenues, by way of attracting 
more prospective nursing home residents and attracting prospective nursing home 
  18	  
residents that are willing to pay higher prices for better care. The relationship between 
nursing home quality and revenues is uncertain, and the literature is mixed and limited. 
Weech-Maldonado and colleagues (2003) did not find a significant association between 
nursing home quality of care (defined by staffing and select QM’s scores) and revenues. 
However, Park, Konetzka and Werner (2011) found that high-quality nursing homes 
(defined as nursing homes with all QM scores above the median) experienced larger 
increases in revenues compared to low-quality nursing homes under NHC.  
There have been numerous studies published on the relationship between nursing 
home quality and expenses. Quality management philosophy suggests that quality may be 
associated with lower costs, defining quality as a measure of an organization’s ability to 
produce a service without error the first time. Healthcare organizations can achieve 
higher quality (fewer errors) and reduced waste (lower costs) if preventive steps can be 
identified in the production process (Binns, 1991). Weech-Maldonado and colleagues 
(2004) have noted the reduction of the incidence of pressure ulcers as an example under 
the quality management philosophy. To explain, nursing homes that implement clinical 
protocols and processes to prevent pressure ulcers can effectively reduce the incidence of 
pressure ulcers and therefore reduce costs due to staffing and supplies.  
The literature on the relationship between nursing home costs and quality of care 
is mixed. Some studies support the idea that nursing home costs are a measure of the 
financial commitment to improving quality of care (Ramsay, Saintford & Zimmerman, 
1995). However, the majority of the studies support the quality management philosophy 
that high quality in nursing homes is significantly associated with lower expenses 
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(Mukamel & Spector, 2000; Weech-Maldonado, Mor & Oluwole, 2004; Hicks et. al, 
2004; Park, Konetzka & Werner, 2011). 
The mixed findings in the literature may be due to methodological variations 
across studies, including different definitions/measurements of quality (i.e. structural, 
process and outcomes measures). Weech-Maldonado, Mor and Oluwole (2004) found 
that nursing homes with better outcomes and process quality experience lower expenses, 
while those with better structural quality (staffing) experience higher costs. It is expected 
that nursing homes with higher RN staffing would experience higher costs, but the result 
would be improved process and, ultimately, better outcomes.  
Quality, Market Share and Occupancy 
There is scant evidence that consumers have driven demand or market changes by 
choosing high-quality nursing homes. Nursing home demand is multifaceted and may be 
influenced by quality, health status, out-of-pocket expenses and family dynamics 
(Norton, 2000). A change in market share as a result of public reporting lends support to 
the use of public reporting to improve quality of care (Werner, Stuart & Polsky, 2010). If 
consumers respond to NHC by utilizing it’s quality ratings data to choose high-quality 
nursing homes, then providers may be motivated to improve quality as a strategy to 
maintain or increase market share. Several studies were published after the launch of 
NHC to determine the relationship between NHC performance and nursing home market 
share. Overall, the studies revealed that NHC had little or no effect on market share. 
Some studies have concluded that nursing homes faced with greater competition in their 
markets tended to improve quality more than those in less competitive markets. 
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Werner, Stuart and Polsky (2010) examined MDS data for three publicly reported 
QM’s from 2003-2005 and found that market share changed after the launch of NHC. A 
similar study published by Grabowski and Town (2011) utilized data from the MDS and 
OSCAR reports from 1999-2005 (before and after the launch of NHC), and it was 
concluded that NHC had very little impact on market share for low and high quality 
nursing homes. However, nursing homes in more competitive markets increased QM 
performance relative to nursing homes with greater market power after the launch of 
NHC. Unlike the pre/post study designs most commonly used, Grabowski and Town 
(2011) tested the effects of NHC using a control group likely unaffected by NHC that 
consisted of the six NHQI pilot states with differential timing for NHC introduction. This 
study was limited to the quality of services provided to long-stay residents at nursing 
homes. A later study by Werner and colleagues (2010) overcame this limitation by 
focusing only on post-acute care residents to control for market share changes that may 
otherwise be driven by difference in price and/or insurance acceptance and had mixed 
findings. Using MDS, OSCAR and the MedPAR file data from 2000-2003 (before and 
after the launch of NHC), it was found that there was a positive and significant 
relationship between quality and market share. Residents were more likely to choose 
high-quality facilities, but the magnitude of the effect was small. 
However limited, the literature is mixed on whether the impact of NHC has driven 
changes in nursing home occupancy. Stevenson (2006) compared the occupancy rate of 
nursing homes with better vs. worse quality (measured by deficiencies and staffing) in a 
pre-/post-NHC comparison study. He found that the effect of NHC on nursing home 
occupancy rates was minimal between 1996-2002, although some estimates of effect 
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were statistically significant and positive. Castle, Engberg, and Liu (2007) found that 
NHC was more likely to impact quality improvement in nursing homes with the lowest 
occupancy rates, although the association was found to be weak. 
In the nursing home industry, the competition between markets may differ 
significantly and significantly impact nursing home market share and occupancy. Some 
markets may have only one or two nursing homes, and may experience high demand 
where notably high occupancy and waiting lists are observed. In 2008, Castle, Liu and 
Engberg improved upon prior research by studying a longer time period from 2004-2006, 
analyzing a total of 15 post-acute and long-term QM’s, and using more refined statistical 
methods, including controlling for regression to the mean. Consistent with their previous 
findings, they concluded that there was an association between nursing home quality and 
occupancy rates, especially for those with the lowest occupancy rates. Expanding upon 
their previous findings, they found that the greatest improvements in quality occurred in 
the most competitive markets.  
Overall occupancy rates have declined in the United States in the last 25 years due 
to the growth of alternatives to nursing home care, including the growth of assisted living 
facilities, as well as home- and community-based services (Grabowski, 2008). In 2013, 
AHCA reported that between 2006-2013, with an average of 31 nursing homes per year, 
the overall occupancy rate has declined from 89% in 2007 to 86% in 2013. In order for 
nursing homes to stay afloat financially, they must attract and maintain private pay and 
Medicare residents.  
Quality and Payor Mix 
  22	  
When analyzing financial performance, it is important to explore the proportion of 
private pay residents in overall occupancy for several reasons. First, the demand for 
nursing home care is associated with private pay census (Castle, 2005). Secondly, private 
pay resident reimbursement is much greater than Medicaid, Medicare and long-term care 
insurance reimbursement. According to the MetLife Market Institute (2012), the average 
private pay rate for a private room in a nursing home was $248 daily or $90,520 annually, 
and for a semi-private room, $222 daily or $81,030 annually. 
To increase revenues, nursing homes strategize to attract more private pay 
residents. Attracting a high proportion of private pay residents can prove to be highly 
lucrative and fruitful in efforts to achieve increase overall financial performance (Weech-
Maldonado, Neff & Mor, 2003). There have been few studies to examine the relationship 
between nursing homes quality and private pay market share and the results are mixed. 
Weech-Maldonado, Neff & Mor (2003) found a positive but insignificant relationship 
between quality of care (defined by process and outcomes measures) and private pay 
market share in nursing homes. In contrast, Castle (2005) found that high-quality (defined 
by high QM scores) nursing homes experienced higher private pay census. It was also 
found that nursing homes could increase their private pay census by increasing quality.  
Medicare is the second highest reimbursement in nursing homes. Medicare is 
provided to people age 65 and older, and provides only short-term, post-acute care 
coverage for up to 100 days of skilled nursing care (as long as the resident shows 
continued improvement from services). To qualify for Medicare coverage, one must have 
had a 3-night inpatient hospital stay and require daily skilled nursing care. Medicaid, 
health care coverage for people under the age of 65 who have disabilities and people 65 
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and older with low income, is the lowest reimbursement of all nursing home payors. In 
2012, the average Medicaid payment rates were $22.34 per resident per day less than the 
average nursing home’s cost to provide services (AHCA Quality Report, 2012).  
There are significant differences in payor mix among for-profit, nonprofit and 
government nursing homes. As illustrated in Figure 1, Medicaid is the most common 
form of reimbursement in nursing homes in all three types of ownership, representing 
more than half of the population in each. Government nursing homes have the highest 
percentage of Medicaid residents. Nonprofit nursing homes lead the industry in private 
payor residents. For-profit nursing homes have the highest percentage of Medicare 
residents and the lowest percentage of private payor residents (AHCA Quality Report, 
2013).  
Park, Konetzka and Werner (2011) found that nursing home that achieved high 
quality, as well as those that showed improvement after the launch of NHC reported 










Medicaid Medicare Private Pay 
Figure 1: Nursing Home Payor Sources  
by Type of Ownership 
For-Profit Nonprofit Government 
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Quality and Profit 
The literature is limited on the quality and profit financial performance 
relationship in nursing homes, and even more limited on how the relationship between 
financial performance and quality differed before and after NHC was launched. Weech-
Maldonado, Neff and Mor (2003) examined data for nursing homes in the five states that 
participated in the Health Care Financing Administration’s (HCFA) Multi-State Case 
Mix and Quality Demonstration in 1996 and found that high-quality (measured by QM’s 
scores) nursing homes were associated with higher operating profit margins. Later in 
2003, Weech-Maldonado, Neff and Mor expanded upon their previous research to 
determine the association between quality (including additional QM’s and staffing) and 
operating profit margins. The findings of this study supported their previous findings.  
Park and Werner (2010) furthered the findings in previous studies by using an 
extensive study period and more robust results from a ten-year panel data set that spanned 
before and after the launch of NHC. They found a modest association between quality 
(QM performance) and total profit margin. Parker, Konetzka and Werner (2011) found a 
positive but insignificant association between high-quality nursing homes (defined as all 
QM scores above the median) and higher total profit margins under NHC. The variations 
in the findings in these studies may have been due to the use of total profit margin as a 
measure of financial performance, rather the more commonly used operating profit 
margin. 
Summary  
The literature on the relationship between quality of care and financial 
performance has shown varied results. The inconsistent findings may be due to 
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methodological variations across the studies. The gaps in the literature may also be due to 
different definitions and measures of quality. Some studies used different structural, 
process and/or outcome measures to assess quality. Likewise, some studies used different 
measures for financial performance such as costs, revenues, total profit margin and/or 
operating profit margin. While resident-level demographic information may influence 
quality and should be risk-adjusted, some studies used case-mix (i.e., facility-level) data 
or did not include any adjustment for variations in patient acuity. The time periods of the 
studies also varied ranging from the inclusion of pre-/post-NHC data to an exclusive 
focus on post-NHC data.  
Methodology 
Overview 
Nursing Home Compare (NHC) aims to improve quality of care in two ways: by 
increasing consumer demand for high-quality care; and incentivizing providers to 
compete on quality of care. By utilizing NHC when choosing a nursing home, consumers 
have access to information to guide their selection of a high-quality facility. This may 
result in increased consumer demand for high-quality care and motivate providers to 
compete for high performance ratings and differentiate themselves from competitors 
(Werner, Stuart, & Polsky, 2010).  
This study sought to answer the question, “Is there an association between quality 
rating performance on Nursing Home Compare and financial performance in nursing 
homes?” The central research question was tested using the following hypothesis tests: 
H1: Nursing homes with higher quality ratings will report higher net resident 
revenues than those with lower quality ratings. 
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H2: Nursing homes with higher quality ratings will report lower total operating 
expenses than those with lower quality ratings. 
H3: Nursing homes with higher quality ratings will report higher operating profit 
margins than those with lower quality ratings. 
H4: Nursing homes with higher quality ratings will report higher occupancy than 
those with lower quality ratings. 
H5: Nursing homes with higher quality ratings will report higher private payor 
census than those with lower quality ratings. 
H6: Nursing homes with higher quality ratings will report higher Medicare census 
than those with lower quality ratings. 
Research Design 
The study used a quantitative, non-experimental design. The data were drawn 
from CMS financial and NHC reports. Using archival data from an approved CMS data 
vendor was appropriate to analyze financial performance over several years. It was not 
possible to control the assignment of which nursing homes were under the Five-Star 
Quality Rating System because CMS requires all Medicare-certified nursing homes to 
participate in NHC. It was also not possible to conduct a prospective longitudinal study 
where nursing homes would be randomly assigned to experimental and control groups. 
Overall, the use of archival, quantitative data appeared to be the most feasible design. 
Financial performance data from 2010-2012 served as the base study period under the 
assumption that financial performance improvement resulting from NHC performance is 
more demonstrable after a one-year lag. 
Data 
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The data for this study came from Medicare Cost Reports 
(http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Downloadable-Public-Use-
Files/Cost-Reports/Cost-Reports-by-Fiscal-Year.html) and NHC  
(http://www.medicare.gov/nursinghomecompare) data sets.  
As all Medicare- and Medicaid-certified nursing homes are required to participate 
in NHC, financial performance in nursing homes was measured using Medicare Cost 
Reports. All Medicare-certified nursing homes are required to file cost reports annually in 
order to receive reimbursement for services provided to Medicare residents. Medicare 
Cost Reports contain unique provider numbers for each nursing home, information on 
facility characteristics, data on costs and charges by center (in total and for Medicare) and 
financial statement data. Although the Medicare Cost Reports are probably imperfect 
indicators of financial performance (Kane & Mangus, 2001), they are widely accepted as 
the primary source of financial data on Medicare-certified institutions (Bazzoli et al., 
2007). 
 Nursing home quality was measured using the Five-Star Quality Rating System 
data sets. The NHC website includes a rating between one and five stars for each nursing 
home. Nursing homes with five stars are considered to have the highest quality and those 
with one star are considered to have the poorest quality. There is an overall quality rating 
for each nursing home that is a composite of three distinct ratings: 1) health inspections; 
2) staffing; and 3) quality measures. NHC ratings are risk-adjusted based on resident 
case-mix to account for differences in the types of residents in facilities that may 
otherwise bias the staffing or quality measures ratings (CMS, 2008). Although the 
strengths and limitations of these measures continue to be debated, because these are 
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widely available and used for indexing the quality of a nursing home, for the purposes of 
this study, the reliability and validity of the quality ratings are not being evaluated. 
Rather, the relationship between the publicly reported quality ratings and financial 
performance is being evaluated. The overall quality rating is used to determine quality in 
terms of all measures that are publicly reported after the launch of the Five-Star Quality 
Rating System on NHC. 
Variables 
Quality. To measure nursing home quality, the overall quality ratings reported in 
the Five-Star Quality Rating System on Nursing Home Compare were used from 2009-
2011. Being that overall quality is a rolling rating that is updated monthly, those ratings 
most closely dated to the month of the cost report end date in the Medicare Cost Report 
were used for the analysis. 
Financial Performance. Financial performance data was obtained from Medicare 
Cost Reports from 2010-2012. Three standard measures of financial performance were 
used: 1) net resident revenues; 2) total operating expenses; and 3) operating profit 
margin. In addition to the three standard financial performance measures used, this 
analysis also includes average occupancy, private payor census and Medicare census 
from Medicare Cost Reports between 2010-2012. Each of these variables was also 
obtained from Medicare Cost Reports. Table 5 shows the rationale for choosing each of 
the dependent variables, as well as the corresponding calculations. 
Control Variables. Type of ownership, chain status, geographic divisions, 
staffing, and inflation were controlled. Type of ownership was obtained from Medicare 
Cost Reports and measured as for-profit or nonprofit status. Higher costs have been found 
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in nonprofit nursing homes (Rosko et. al, 1995). Also, differences in payor mix have been 
found between for-profit and nonprofit nursing homes. For-profit nursing homes have 
been found to have 13% more Medicaid residents and 2.4% more Medicare residents than 
nonprofit nursing homes. Nonprofit nursing homes are more likely to provide services to 
more private pay patients, approximately 8% more than for-profit nursing homes (AHCA 
Quality Report, 2012). 
Chain status was obtained from Medicare Cost Reports and used to control for 
differences in nursing homes that are owned by chains and those that are not. Nursing 
homes that are part of chains may benefit from greater economies of scale, which are 
expected to result in lower cost and greater resources that can result in better 
management, staffing, education and technology. 
Data was obtained from the United States Census Bureau 
(https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/gtc/gtc_census_divreg.html) to determine which 
of the nine census divisions (subcategories of the four census regions) each nursing home 
was assigned, based on geographic location. Census divisions are groupings of states and 
the District of Columbia that were used in this study to control for differing results 
between geographic locations which may be due to differences in population, the demand 
for nursing homes and competition. The nine census divisions are: 1) New England; 2) 
Middle Atlantic; 3) East North Central; 4) West North Central; 5) South Atlantic 
Division; 6) East South Central; 7) West South Central; 8) Mountain; and 9) Pacific. 
Staffing ratings were obtained from NHC and used to account for differences in 
nurse staffing levels between nursing homes, which could impact costs, profit, efficiency 
and resident health outcomes.  
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As cost varies over time due to annual inflation, all cost data were inflation-
adjusted using the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics Nursing Homes 
and Adult Day Services Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
(http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpi_dr.htm). The inflation coefficient is a measure of the average 
change over time in healthcare services compared to a reference period. All financial data 
were normalized to the year 2013. 
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Table 5: Financial Performance Measures 
   
Variable  Rationale   Calculation  
Net Resident Revenues Net resident revenues tell how much gross 
revenue is earned from services to nursing 
home residents.  
Net resident revenues are the 
total revenue earned after the 
deduction of contractual 
adjustments, allowances for 
bad debts and charity care 
from the gross routine and 
ancillary services revenue. 
Total Operating Expenses Total operating expenses tells how much 
nursing homes invest in resident care. 
Total operating expenses is the 
sum of all indirect, direct and 
ancillary costs associated with 
resident care 
Operating Profit Margin Operating profit margin is a ratio that tells 
of a nursing home’s efficiency and accounts 
for net income related to resident care only 
as a proportion of operating (or net resident) 
revenues. 
The operating profit margin is 
calculated by dividing net 
income (total expenses 
subtracted from total revenues) 
by net resident revenues.  
Occupancy Occupancy is a measure of increasing or 
decreasing resident volume. 
Occupancy is calculated by 
dividing the total number of 
bed days (number of actual 
inpatient days billed annually) 
by the number of bed days 
available (maximum number 
of inpatient days that may be 
billed annually) per the 
Medicare certification 
Private Payor Census As private payor reimbursement is much 
greater than Medicare and Medicaid 
reimbursement, private pay census greatly 
impacts net resident revenues. It is also a 
measure of demand for nursing home 
services.  
Private payor census is 
calculated by dividing the 
number of “other” resident 
days (number of actual 
inpatient days billed annually 
for private insurance and out-
of-pocket paying residents) by 
the total number of days 
(number of actual inpatient 
days billed annually). 
Medicare Census As Medicare reimbursement is significantly 
higher than Medicaid reimbursement, 
Medicare census greatly impacts net 
resident revenues. Being that it pays the 
same across all nursing homes, Medicare 
census is also a measure of demand for 
nursing home services.  
Medicare census is calculated 
by dividing the number of the 
Medicare resident days 
(number of actual inpatient 
days billed annually for 
Medicare residents) by the 
total number of days (number 




 The sample consisted of all Medicare-certified, freestanding nursing homes in the 
United States. In accord with previous studies, hospital-affiliated nursing homes were 
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excluded as they tend to have different strategic goals, resident case mixes, marketing 
strategies, care practices and accounting systems and/or cost structures (Banaszak-Holl, 
Zinn, & Mor, 1996; Pizer, White, & White, 2002). The initial data set, merged from three 
sources (NHC, Medicare Cost Reports and United States Census Bureau), included 
14,695 Medicare-certified, freestanding nursing homes in the United States. Nursing 
homes with incomplete data or inconsistent reporting between the years of the study (i.e., 
an NHC rating in 2009, but no Medicare Cost Report in 2010) were excluded from the 
study. Excluded cases numbered 4.63% percent of sample for 2010, 3.78% for 2011, and 
3.23% for 2012. The final analytical file included 14,015 nursing homes in 2010; 14,139 
nursing homes in 2011; and 14,221 nursing homes included in 2012.  
Analysis 
 The purpose of this study was to determine the relationship between NHC 
performance and financial performance. NHC and financial performance data were 
obtained and analyzed. The years of the financial performance data (2010-2012) served 
as the base study period for data analysis. The assumption was that financial performance 
improvement resulting from NHC performance is more demonstrable after a 1-year lag. 
Therefore, the overall ratings examined were from 2009-2011.  
 The data were analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS) version 22 (King, Rosopa, & Minium, 2010). Because the interpretation of 
financial data can be difficult if dollars in one year are compared with dollars in another 
year, the financial data was adjusted using the annual Consumer Price Index. 
Specifically, a multiplier was used, which adjusted dollars to a common reference year of 
2013.  
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Generalized linear models with a gamma transformation were the most 
appropriate analytical technique for the highly skewed nature of healthcare financial data. 
Adjusting for the non-normality of the data, the generalized linear models required the 
dependent variable to be strictly positive. In cases where nursing homes reported negative 
values for any of the three financial performance variables (net resident revenues, total 
operating expenses or operating profit margin), a constant was added that was 
approximately equal to the minimum value of each variable. If the minimum value for 
any dependent variable was zero, 0.01 was added. For all models, staffing ratings, type of 
ownership, chain status, and geographic divisions were used as control variables. 
Results 
The final dataset contained 14221 nursing homes. The sample included CMS-
certified, freestanding skilled nursing facilities in the United States that participated in 
NHC from 2009-2011 and submitted Medicare Cost Reports from 2010-2012. There 
were 14,015 nursing homes in 2010; 14,139 nursing homes in 2011; and 14,265 nursing 
homes included in 2012.  
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 6 presents descriptive statistics for the independent variable, overall quality 
rating, as well as a covariate, the staffing rating, by calendar year. The benchmark for 
both the overall quality rating and the staffing rating is five stars (or a score of 50). 
Nursing homes have shown consistent improvement in quality, as indicated by the steady 
increase in the overall quality rating means from 2009-2011. Table 7 provides the 
descriptive statistics for all dependent variables (net resident revenues, total operating 
expenses, operating profit margin, occupancy, private payor census and Medicare 
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census). Table 8 explains the descriptive statistics for the other control variables used 
(type of ownership, chain status and geographic divisions). 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for Overall Quality & Staffing Ratings, 2009-2011 
          
  Year N Mean Standard Deviation 
Overall Quality Rating 2009 14015 28.529 13.7185 
2010 14139 30.0347 13.54350 
2011 14265 30.4262 13.52541 
Staffing Rating 2009 14015 29.2101 15.04134 
2010 14139 30.7037 14.38438 
2011 14265 31.7378 14.53384 
 
 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for Financial Performance Measures, 2010-2012 
 
     Variable Year N  Mean   Standard Deviation  
Net Resident Revenues 2010 14015 12762060.00 58764735.60  
2011 14139 12313094.70 7969963.44 
2012 14265 8989144.33 8589683.45 
Total Operating 
Expenses 
2010 14015 9530990.11 8565126.25 
2011 14139 9465418.84 8368939.30 
2012 14265 9341558.65 9265265.86 
Operating Profit Margin 2010 14015 21.03% .71% 
2011 14139 678.31% 46661.78% 
2012 14265 129984.32% 1259.23% 
Occupancy 2010 14015 85.72% 261.00% 
2011 14139 90.62% 500.237% 
2012 14265 85.22% 187.27% 
Private Pay Census 2010 14015 31.70% 29.10% 
2011 14139 33.52% 31.82% 
2012 14265 31.27% 25.53% 
Medicare Census 2010 14015 17.13% 16.10% 
2011 14139 17.78% 17.52% 
2012 14265 15.93% 14.71% 
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Table 8: Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables, 2010-2012 
 
Variable Year Key N Percent 



























Chain Status 2010 Chain 

















Geographic Divisions 2010 1 New England 
2  Middle Atlantic 
3  East North Central 
4 West North Central 
5 South Atlantic Division 
6 East South Central 
7 West South Central 




















2011 1 New England 
2  Middle Atlantic 
3  East North Central 
4 West North Central 
5 South Atlantic Division 
6 East South Central 
7 West South Central 




















2012 1 New England 
2  Middle Atlantic 
3  East North Central 
4 West North Central 
5 South Atlantic Division 
6 East South Central 
7 West South Central 
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Statistical Modeling 
For analysis of the quality ratings and financial performance, several models were 
constructed using SPSS. The initial model contained the net resident revenues as the 
dependent variable with the overall quality ratings from Nursing Home Compare, type of 
ownership, chain status, geographic divisions, and staffing as independent variables. The 
model was evaluated using Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness of fit and Concordance c 
statistics. Model fit was moderately high indicating important covariates had been 
included.  
Additional models were then constructed using total operating expenses, 
operating profit margin, average occupancy, average private pay census, and average 
Medicare census as dependent variables with the same covariates as were included in the 
net resident revenue model. The following section describes the results of each model test 
by hypothesis. While adjustment for inflation used 2013 as a reference year, financial 
performance data from 2010-2012 served as the base study period under the assumption 
that financial performance improvement resulting from NHC performance is more 
demonstrable after a one-year lag.  
H1: Nursing homes with higher quality ratings will report higher net resident 
revenues than those with lower quality ratings. 
 The omnibus tests revealed that the corresponding model outperformed the 
intercept model (p < 0.05) for each year between 2010-2012. Also, for each year of the 
study, each set of variables had a statistically significant effect in the model, including the 
overall quality rating, staffing, type of ownership, chain status and census divisions (p < 
0.05). As indicated in Table 9, the estimated coefficient for quality ratings was found to 
  37	  
be positive and statistically significant (B = .009, p < .01) for 2010. Tables 10 and 11 
show that the coefficients were not statistically significant for 2011 or 2012. Nursing 
homes with higher quality ratings were positively associated with higher net resident 
revenues in 2010, but there was no association found for 2011 or 2012. 
Table 9: 2010 Parameter Estimates with Net Resident Revenues as 
Dependent Variable 
              
Parameter B Std. Error 
95% Wald 
Confidence 
Interval   
Hypothesis 
Test   
      Lower Upper Wald Chi-Square Sig. 
(Intercept) 16.232 0.0286 16.175 16.288 322383.396 0 
[FiscalYearsDaysDum=0] -0.195 0.0164 -0.228 -0.163 142.007 0 
[FiscalYearsDaysDum=1] 0a . . . . . 
[Division=1.0] 0.118 0.0217 0.075 0.161 29.43 0 
[Division=2.0] 0.55 0.0192 0.513 0.588 819.066 0 
[Division=3.0] 0.132 0.0166 0.099 0.164 63.226 0 
[Division=4.0] -0.36 0.0185 -0.396 -0.324 379.112 0 
[Division=5.0] 0.134 0.0174 0.1 0.168 59.31 0 
[Division=6.0] -0.036 0.0204 -0.076 0.004 3.15 0.076 
[Division=7.0] -0.271 0.0181 -0.307 -0.236 224.11 0 
[Division=8.0] -0.109 0.0274 -0.162 -0.055 15.769 0 
[Division=9.0] 0a . . . . . 
[DumChain=0] -0.144 0.0096 -0.162 -0.125 225.659 0 
[DumChain=1] 0a . . . . . 
[ControlNew=1.00] 0.046 0.0236 0 0.092 3.806 0.051 
[ControlNew=2.00] -0.044 0.0225 -0.088 0 3.801 0.051 
[ControlNew=3.00] 0a . . . . . 
OverallRating2009 0.009 0.0035 0.002 0.016 6.988 0.008 
StaffingRating2009 0.004 0.0003 0.004 0.005 155.635 0 
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Table 10: 2011 Parameter Estimates with Net Resident Revenues as 
Dependent Variable 
       




  Hypothesis Test   
      Lower Upper Wald Chi-Square Sig. 
(Intercept) 16.459 0.0248 16.411 16.508 440509.152 0 
[FiscalYearsDaysDum=0] -0.144 0.014 -0.171 -0.116 105.026 0 
[FiscalYearsDaysDum=1] 0a . . . . . 
[Division=1.0] 0.074 0.0185 0.038 0.11 16.074 0 
[Division=2.0] 0.433 0.0164 0.401 0.465 699.685 0 
[Division=3.0] -0.097 0.0141 -0.125 -0.07 47.468 0 
[Division=4.0] -0.42 0.0156 -0.451 -0.389 723.041 0 
[Division=5.0] 0.081 0.0147 0.052 0.109 30.008 0 
[Division=6.0] -0.077 0.0173 -0.111 -0.043 19.786 0 
[Division=7.0] -0.328 0.0154 -0.358 -0.297 451.943 0 
[Division=8.0] -0.136 0.0231 -0.181 -0.091 34.698 0 
[Division=9.0] 0a . . . . . 
[DumChain=0] -0.065 0.0081 -0.081 -0.049 65.206 0 
[DumChain=1] 0a . . . . . 
[ControlNew=1.00] 0.079 0.02 0.04 0.118 15.632 0 
[ControlNew=2.00] -0.095 0.0191 -0.132 -0.057 24.703 0 
[ControlNew=3.00] 0a . . . . . 
OverallRating2010 -0.002 0.0003 -0.002 -0.001 28.436 0 
StaffingRating2010 0.001 0.0003 0 0.002 12.043 0.001 
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Table 11: 2012 Parameter Estimates with Net Resident Revenues as 
Dependent Variable 
       




  Hypothesis Test   
      Lower Upper Wald Chi-Square Sig. 
(Intercept) 16.267 0.0331 16.202 16.332 241447.446 0 
[FiscalYearsDaysDum=0] -0.734 0.0184 -0.77 -0.698 1596.667 0 
[FiscalYearsDaysDum=1] 0a . . . . . 
[Division=1.0] 0.096 0.0245 0.048 0.144 15.34 0 
[Division=2.0] 0.522 0.0217 0.479 0.564 578.377 0 
[Division=3.0] -0.138 0.0187 -0.175 -0.102 54.836 0 
[Division=4.0] -0.568 0.0207 -0.608 -0.527 754.256 0 
[Division=5.0] 0.098 0.0195 0.059 0.136 25.062 0 
[Division=6.0] -0.133 0.0228 -0.178 -0.088 33.831 0 
[Division=7.0] -0.447 0.0203 -0.486 -0.407 483.599 0 
[Division=8.0] -0.182 0.0304 -0.241 -0.122 35.637 0 
[Division=9.0] 0a . . . . . 
[DumChain=0] -0.08 0.0107 -0.101 -0.059 55.826 0 
[DumChain=1] 0a . . . . . 
[ControlNew=1.00] 0.06 0.0264 0.008 0.112 5.191 0.023 
[ControlNew=2.00] -0.181 0.0252 -0.231 -0.132 51.821 0 
[ControlNew=3.00] 0a . . . . . 
OverallRating2011 -0.002 0.0004 -0.003 -0.001 25.883 0 
StaffingRating2011 0.001 0.0004 0 0.002 10.198 0.001 
 
 
H2: Nursing homes with higher quality ratings will report lower total operating 
expenses than those with lower quality ratings. 
The omnibus tests revealed that the corresponding model outperformed the 
intercept model (p < 0.05) for each year between 2010-2012. Also, for each year of the 
study, each set of variables had a statistically significant effect in the model, including the 
overall quality rating, staffing, type of ownership, chain status and census divisions (p < 
0.05). As indicated in Tables 12-14, the estimated coefficient for quality ratings was 
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found to be negative and statistically significant (p < .01) for each of the three years of 
the study. Nursing homes with higher quality ratings were associated with lower total 
operating expenses in 2010-2012. 
Table 12: 2010 Parameter Estimates with Total Operating Expenses as 
Dependent Variable 
       
Parameter B Std. Error 
95% Wald 
Confidence 
Interval   
Hypothesis 
Test   
      Lower Upper Wald Chi-Square Sig. 
(Intercept) 16.272 0.0469 16.18 16.364 120339.547 0 
[FiscalYearsDaysDum=0] -0.18 0.0267 -0.232 -0.128 45.512 0 
[FiscalYearsDaysDum=1] 0a . . . . . 
[Division=1.0] 0.193 0.0353 0.124 0.262 29.931 0 
[Division=2.0] 0.604 0.0313 0.543 0.666 373.442 0 
[Division=3.0] -0.086 0.0271 -0.139 -0.033 10.087 0.001 
[Division=4.0] -0.542 0.03 -0.601 -0.484 327.33 0 
[Division=5.0] 0.174 0.0282 0.119 0.229 38.097 0 
[Division=6.0] -0.052 0.0331 -0.117 0.013 2.445 0.118 
[Division=7.0] -0.401 0.0294 -0.459 -0.344 185.882 0 
[Division=8.0] -0.092 0.0444 -0.18 -0.005 4.325 0.038 
[Division=9.0] 0a . . . . . 
[DumChain=0] -0.065 0.0156 -0.095 -0.034 17.29 0 
[DumChain=1] 0a . . . . . 
[ControlNew=1.00] 0.052 0.0384 -0.024 0.127 1.815 0.178 
[ControlNew=2.00] -0.291 0.0365 -0.362 -0.219 63.267 0 
[ControlNew=3.00] 0a . . . . . 
OverallRating2009 -0.035 0.0057 -0.046 -0.023 36.22 0 
StaffingRating2009 0.004 0.0005 0.003 0.005 50.599 0 
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Table 13: 2011 Parameter Estimates with Total Operating Expenses as 
Dependent Variable 
              




  Hypothesis Test   
      Lower Upper Wald Chi-Square Sig. 
(Intercept) 16.264 0.0445 16.177 16.352 133656.557 0 
[FiscalYearsDaysDum=0] -0.184 0.0252 -0.234 -0.135 53.483 0 
[FiscalYearsDaysDum=1] 0a . . . . . 
[Division=1.0] 0.116 0.0331 0.051 0.181 12.276 0 
[Division=2.0] 0.542 0.0294 0.484 0.6 339.242 0 
[Division=3.0] -0.128 0.0253 -0.178 -0.079 25.761 0 
[Division=4.0] -0.576 0.028 -0.631 -0.521 423.051 0 
[Division=5.0] 0.124 0.0264 0.072 0.176 22.126 0 
[Division=6.0] -0.095 0.031 -0.155 -0.034 9.309 0.002 
[Division=7.0] -0.435 0.0277 -0.489 -0.381 247.205 0 
[Division=8.0] -0.099 0.0414 -0.18 -0.018 5.714 0.017 
[Division=9.0] 0a . . . . . 
[DumChain=0] -0.051 0.0146 -0.08 -0.023 12.395 0 
[DumChain=1] 0a . . . . . 
[ControlNew=1.00] 0.078 0.0359 0.007 0.148 4.652 0.031 
[ControlNew=2.00] -0.266 0.0343 -0.334 -0.199 60.386 0 
[ControlNew=3.00] 0a . . . . . 
OverallRating2010 -0.002 0.0005 -0.003 -0.001 16.799 0 
StaffingRating2010 0.003 0.0005 0.002 0.004 35.507 0 
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Table 14: 2012 Parameter Estimates with Total Operating Expenses as 
Dependent Variable 
              




  Hypothesis Test   
      Lower Upper Wald Chi-Square Sig. 
(Intercept) 16.289 0.0327 16.224 16.353 248007.184 0 
[FiscalYearsDaysDum=0] -0.739 0.0181 -0.774 -0.704 1665.746 0 
[FiscalYearsDaysDum=1] 0a . . . . . 
[Division=1.0] 0.131 0.0243 0.084 0.179 29.279 0 
[Division=2.0] 0.539 0.0215 0.497 0.581 630.635 0 
[Division=3.0] -0.124 0.0185 -0.16 -0.087 44.563 0 
[Division=4.0] -0.569 0.0205 -0.609 -0.529 774.073 0 
[Division=5.0] 0.128 0.0193 0.09 0.166 44.068 0 
[Division=6.0] -0.14 0.0226 -0.184 -0.095 38.142 0 
[Division=7.0] -0.438 0.0201 -0.477 -0.399 476.942 0 
[Division=8.0] -0.131 0.0301 -0.19 -0.071 18.737 0 
[Division=9.0] 0a . . . . . 
[DumChain=0] -0.055 0.0106 -0.076 -0.035 27.513 0 
[DumChain=1] 0a . . . . . 
[ControlNew=1.00] 0.065 0.0261 0.014 0.116 6.25 0.012 
[ControlNew=2.00] -0.275 0.0249 -0.324 -0.227 122.319 0 
[ControlNew=3.00] 0a . . . . . 
OverallRating2011 -0.002 0.0004 -0.003 -0.001 29.541 0 
StaffingRating2011 0.003 0.0004 0.002 0.004 66.407 0 
 
H3: Nursing homes with higher quality ratings will report higher operating profit 
margins than those with lower quality ratings.  
The omnibus tests revealed that the corresponding model outperformed the 
intercept model (p < 0.05) for each year between 2010-2012. As indicated in Table 16, 
each set of variables in 2011 had a statistically significant effect in the model, including 
the overall quality rating, staffing, type of ownership, chain status and census divisions (p 
< 0.05). Tables 15 and 17 show, however, that only the intercepts had a statistically 
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significant effect in 2010 and 2012. Table 15 also shows that the estimated coefficient for 
quality ratings was found to be positive, but not statistically significant for 2010 (B = 
.000, p = .525). For 2011, the coefficients were negative and statistically significant (B = 
-.069, p < 0.05). For 2012, the coefficients were negative and not statistically significant 
(B = -2.75E-06, p = .896). Nursing homes with higher quality ratings were not associated 
with higher operating profit margins between 2010-2012. 
Table 15: 2010 Parameter Estimates with Operating Profit Margin as Dependent 
Variable 
       




  Hypothesis Test   
      Lower Upper Wald Chi-Square Sig. 
(Intercept) 3.049 0.0023 3.044 3.053 1781368.157 0 
[FiscalYearsDaysDum=0] -0.002 0.0013 -0.004 0.001 1.743 0.187 
[FiscalYearsDaysDum=1] 0a . . . . . 
[Division=1.0] -0.003 0.0017 -0.006 0.001 2.577 0.108 
[Division=2.0] 0.001 0.0015 -0.002 0.004 0.325 0.569 
[Division=3.0] -0.001 0.0013 -0.004 0.001 0.704 0.402 
[Division=4.0] -0.001 0.0015 -0.004 0.002 0.658 0.417 
[Division=5.0] -0.001 0.0014 -0.004 0.002 0.579 0.447 
[Division=6.0] -0.004 0.0016 -0.007 0 5.028 0.025 
[Division=7.0] -0.003 0.0014 -0.006 -1.80E-05 3.891 0.049 
[Division=8.0] -0.004 0.0022 -0.008 0.001 2.634 0.105 
[Division=9.0] 0a . . . . . 
[DumChain=0] -4.58E-06 0.0008 -0.001 0.001 0 0.995 
[DumChain=1] 0a . . . . . 
[ControlNew=1.00] 9.61E-05 0.0019 -0.004 0.004 0.003 0.959 
[ControlNew=2.00] 0.001 0.0018 -0.002 0.005 0.401 0.527 
[ControlNew=3.00] 0a . . . . . 
OverallRating2009 0 0.0003 0 0.001 0.404 0.525 
StaffingRating2009 -7.90E-05 2.58E-05 0 -2.85E-05 9.411 0.002 
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Table 16: 2011 Parameter Estimates with Operating Profit Margin as 
Dependent Variable 
              




  Hypothesis Test   
      Lower Upper Wald Chi-Square Sig. 
(Intercept) 0.931 0.0114 0.909 0.953 6701.995 0 
[FiscalYearsDaysDum=0] 1.589 0.0113 1.567 1.611 19739.544 0 
[FiscalYearsDaysDum=1] 0a . . . . . 
[Division=1.0] -0.747 0.0055 -0.758 -0.736 18292.797 0 
[Division=2.0] 0.976 0.0061 0.964 0.988 25957.263 0 
[Division=3.0] 0.912 0.0047 0.903 0.921 37157.036 0 
[Division=4.0] 0.448 0.0049 0.439 0.458 8270.75 0 
[Division=5.0] 0.615 0.0043 0.607 0.624 20147.801 0 
[Division=6.0] 0.2 0.0047 0.19 0.209 1789.921 0 
[Division=7.0] 11.626 0.1134 11.403 11.848 10502.466 0 
[Division=8.0] -0.099 0.007 -0.112 -0.085 196.284 0 
[Division=9.0] 0a . . . . . 
[DumChain=0] 1.947 0.0064 1.935 1.96 92878.146 0 
[DumChain=1] 0a . . . . . 
[ControlNew=1.00] 1.143 0.0118 1.12 1.166 9388.079 0 
[ControlNew=2.00] 0.116 0.0103 0.096 0.137 128.274 0 
[ControlNew=3.00] 0a . . . . . 
OverallRating2010 -0.069 0.0001 -0.069 -0.069 371102.345 0 
StaffingRating2010 0.133 0.0002 0.133 0.134 694145.584 0 
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Table 17: 2012 Parameter Estimates with Operating Profit Margin as Dependent 
Variable 
              




  Hypothesis Test   
      Lower Upper Wald Chi-Square Sig. 
(Intercept) 11.776 0.0018 11.772 11.779 43991259.23 0 
[FiscalYearsDaysDum=0] -0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.896 0.344 
[FiscalYearsDaysDum=1] 0a . . . . . 
[Division=1.0] 3.90E-05 0.0013 -0.003 0.003 0.001 0.976 
[Division=2.0] 0 0.0012 -0.002 0.002 0.021 0.885 
[Division=3.0] 0 0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.051 0.821 
[Division=4.0] 0 0.0011 -0.002 0.002 0.008 0.928 
[Division=5.0] 1.68E-05 0.0011 -0.002 0.002 0 0.987 
[Division=6.0] 5.25E-06 0.0012 -0.002 0.002 0 0.997 
[Division=7.0] 0 0.0011 -0.002 0.002 0.071 0.79 
[Division=8.0] 4.56E-05 0.0016 -0.003 0.003 0.001 0.978 
[Division=9.0] 0a . . . . . 
[DumChain=0] 0 0.0006 -0.001 0.001 0.343 0.558 
[DumChain=1] 0a . . . . . 
[ControlNew=1.00] -0.001 0.0014 -0.003 0.002 0.125 0.724 
[ControlNew=2.00] 0 0.0014 -0.003 0.003 0.012 0.912 
[ControlNew=3.00] 0a . . . . . 
OverallRating2011 -2.75E-06 2.10E-05 -4.40E-05 3.85E-05 0.017 0.896 
StaffingRating2011 4.85E-06 2.02E-05 -3.47E-05 4.44E-05 0.058 0.81 
 
H4: Nursing homes with higher quality ratings will report higher occupancy than 
those with lower quality ratings.  
The omnibus tests revealed that the corresponding model outperformed the 
intercept model (p < 0.05) for each year between 2010-2012. Also, in 2012, each set of 
variables had a statistically significant effect in the model, including the overall quality 
rating, staffing, type of ownership, chain status and census divisions (p < 0.05). In 2011, 
the intercept had an insignificant effect in the model. The effect of the overall quality 
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rating of 2009 was found to be insignificant for occupancy in 2010. As indicated in Table 
18, the estimated coefficient for quality ratings was found to be negative and not 
statistically significant (B = -.003, p = .203) for 2010. Table 19 shows that the 
coefficients were positive and statistically significant for 2011 (B = .002, p < 0.05), and 
Table 20 shows the same for 2012 (B = .002, p < 0.05). Nursing homes with higher 
quality ratings were positively associated with higher occupancy in 2011 and 2012, but 
there was no association found in 2010. 
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Table 18: 2010 Parameter Estimates with Occupancy as Dependent 
Variable 
       







  Hypothesis Test   
      Lower Upper Wald Chi-Square Sig. 
(Intercept) -0.215 0.0222 -0.259 -0.172 94.192 0 
[FiscalYearsDaysDum=0] -0.082 0.0125 -0.106 -0.057 42.568 0 
[FiscalYearsDaysDum=1] 0a . . . . . 
[Division=1.0] 0.068 0.0166 0.035 0.1 16.794 0 
[Division=2.0] 0.066 0.0146 0.037 0.095 20.513 0 
[Division=3.0] 0.096 0.0127 0.071 0.121 56.996 0 
[Division=4.0] -0.063 0.0141 -0.091 -0.035 20 0 
[Division=5.0] 0.063 0.0132 0.037 0.089 22.927 0 
[Division=6.0] 0.052 0.0156 0.022 0.083 11.197 0.001 
[Division=7.0] -0.196 0.0138 -0.223 -0.169 202.622 0 
[Division=8.0] -0.09 0.0209 -0.131 -0.049 18.545 0 
[Division=9.0] 0a . . . . . 
[DumChain=0] 0.059 0.0073 0.044 0.073 65.408 0 
[DumChain=1] 0a . . . . . 
[ControlNew=1.00] 0.063 0.018 0.028 0.099 12.371 0 
[ControlNew=2.00] 0.066 0.0171 0.033 0.1 15.077 0 
[ControlNew=3.00] 0a . . . . . 
OverallRating2009 -0.003 0.0027 -0.009 0.002 1.618 0.203 
StaffingRating2009 -0.001 0.0003 -0.001 0 8.157 0.004 
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Table 19: 2011 Parameter Estimates with Occupancy as Dependent Variable 
              




  Hypothesis Test   
      Lower Upper Wald Chi-Square Sig. 
(Intercept) -0.029 0.0297 -0.087 0.029 0.965 0.326 
[FiscalYearsDaysDum=0] -0.133 0.0167 -0.165 -0.1 63.057 0 
[FiscalYearsDaysDum=1] 0a . . . . . 
[Division=1.0] -0.145 0.0219 -0.188 -0.102 43.99 0 
[Division=2.0] -0.146 0.019 -0.183 -0.109 59.119 0 
[Division=3.0] -0.057 0.0167 -0.09 -0.024 11.621 0.001 
[Division=4.0] -0.33 0.0183 -0.366 -0.294 323.359 0 
[Division=5.0] -0.14 0.0175 -0.174 -0.106 64.276 0 
[Division=6.0] -0.155 0.0206 -0.196 -0.115 57.027 0 
[Division=7.0] -0.422 0.0183 -0.458 -0.387 534.593 0 
[Division=8.0] -0.274 0.0275 -0.327 -0.22 99.115 0 
[Division=9.0] 0a . . . . . 
[DumChain=0] 0.174 0.0097 0.155 0.193 321.94 0 
[DumChain=1] 0a . . . . . 
[ControlNew=1.00] 0.331 0.0237 0.284 0.378 194.335 0 
[ControlNew=2.00] 0.078 0.0226 0.034 0.122 11.91 0.001 
[ControlNew=3.00] 0a . . . . . 
OverallRating2010 0.002 0.0004 0.002 0.003 40.614 0 
StaffingRating2010 -0.005 0.0003 -0.006 -0.005 251.882 0 
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Table 20: 2012 Parameter Estimates with Occupancy as Dependent Variable 
              




  Hypothesis Test   
      Lower Upper Wald Chi-Square Sig. 
(Intercept) 4.495 0.018 4.46 4.531 62209.284 0 
[FiscalYearsDaysDum=0] -0.075 0.01 -0.095 -0.055 55.962 0 
[FiscalYearsDaysDum=1] 0a . . . . . 
[Division=1.0] 0.065 0.0134 0.038 0.091 23.259 0 
[Division=2.0] 0.176 0.0117 0.153 0.199 225.159 0 
[Division=3.0] 0.001 0.0102 -0.019 0.021 0.009 0.925 
[Division=4.0] -0.057 0.0113 -0.079 -0.035 25.712 0 
[Division=5.0] 0.048 0.0107 0.027 0.069 20.327 0 
[Division=6.0] 0.099 0.0125 0.074 0.123 62.34 0 
[Division=7.0] -0.175 0.011 -0.196 -0.153 249.8 0 
[Division=8.0] -0.123 0.0166 -0.156 -0.09 54.675 0 
[Division=9.0] 0a . . . . . 
[DumChain=0] 0.031 0.0058 0.02 0.043 29.131 0 
[DumChain=1] 0a . . . . . 
[ControlNew=1.00] -0.093 0.0144 -0.121 -0.064 41.234 0 
[ControlNew=2.00] -0.094 0.0137 -0.121 -0.067 46.891 0 
[ControlNew=3.00] 0a . . . . . 
OverallRating2011 0.002 0.0002 0.002 0.003 112.266 0 
StaffingRating2011 -0.001 0.0002 -0.002 -0.001 49.817 0 
 
H5: Nursing homes with higher quality ratings will report higher private payor 
census than those with lower quality ratings. 
 The omnibus tests revealed that the corresponding model outperformed the 
intercept model (p < 0.05) for each year between 2010-2012. In 2012, each set of 
variables had a statistically significant effect in the model, including the overall quality 
rating, staffing, type of ownership, chain status and census divisions (p < 0.05). However, 
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chain status and staffing did not have a statistically significant effect in the model in 
2011. In 2010, staffing did not have a significant effect in the model. Tables 21-23 show 
that the estimated coefficient for quality ratings was found to be positive and statistically 
significant (p < 0.05) for all three years of the study. Nursing homes with higher quality 
ratings were positively associated with higher private payor census for all three years of 
the study. 
Table 21: 2010 Parameter Estimates with Private Payor Census as Dependent 
Variable 
       




  Hypothesis Test   
      Lower Upper Wald Chi-Square Sig. 
(Intercept) -1.365 0.0441 -1.452 -1.279 959.731 0 
[FiscalYearsDaysDum=0] 0.227 0.0253 0.177 0.277 80.482 0 
[FiscalYearsDaysDum=1] 0a . . . . . 
[Division=1.0] -0.035 0.0333 -0.1 0.03 1.108 0.293 
[Division=2.0] 0.027 0.0291 -0.03 0.084 0.86 0.354 
[Division=3.0] 0.238 0.0256 0.188 0.289 86.578 0 
[Division=4.0] 0.382 0.0281 0.327 0.437 185.383 0 
[Division=5.0] 0.136 0.0267 0.084 0.188 25.972 0 
[Division=6.0] 0.169 0.0313 0.107 0.23 29.023 0 
[Division=7.0] -0.09 0.0277 -0.145 -0.036 10.629 0.001 
[Division=8.0] 0.071 0.042 -0.011 0.153 2.846 0.092 
[Division=9.0] 0a . . . . . 
[DumChain=0] -0.042 0.0145 -0.071 -0.014 8.566 0.003 
[DumChain=1] 0a . . . . . 
[ControlNew=1.00] 0.13 0.0363 0.059 0.201 12.878 0 
[ControlNew=2.00] -0.156 0.0343 -0.223 -0.089 20.741 0 
[ControlNew=3.00] 0a . . . . . 
OverallRating2009 0.052 0.0054 0.042 0.063 94.296 0 
StaffingRating2009 0 0.0005 -0.001 0.001 0.562 0.453 
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Table 22: 2011 Parameter Estimates with Private Payor Census as 
Dependent Variable 
              




  Hypothesis Test   
      Lower Upper Wald Chi-Square Sig. 
(Intercept) -1.387 0.0446 -1.475 -1.3 969.192 0 
[FiscalYearsDaysDum=0] 0.24 0.0256 0.19 0.291 87.932 0 
[FiscalYearsDaysDum=1] 0a . . . . . 
[Division=1.0] -0.037 0.0335 -0.102 0.029 1.203 0.273 
[Division=2.0] 0.188 0.0295 0.13 0.245 40.39 0 
[Division=3.0] 0.304 0.0257 0.254 0.354 139.749 0 
[Division=4.0] 0.385 0.0282 0.33 0.44 186.528 0 
[Division=5.0] 0.121 0.0268 0.069 0.174 20.549 0 
[Division=6.0] 0.184 0.0315 0.123 0.246 34.284 0 
[Division=7.0] -0.046 0.0281 -0.101 0.009 2.701 0.1 
[Division=8.0] 0.084 0.0419 0.002 0.166 4.009 0.045 
[Division=9.0] 0a . . . . . 
[DumChain=0] 0.01 0.0145 -0.019 0.038 0.449 0.503 
[DumChain=1] 0a . . . . . 
[ControlNew=1.00] 0.124 0.0364 0.053 0.196 11.615 0.001 
[ControlNew=2.00] -0.144 0.0344 -0.211 -0.077 17.538 0 
[ControlNew=3.00] 0a . . . . . 
OverallRating2010 0.005 0.0005 0.004 0.006 85.421 0 
StaffingRating2010 0.001 0.0005 0 0.002 2.293 0.13 
 
  
  52	  
Table 23: 2012 Parameter Estimates with Private Payor Census as Dependent 
Variable 
              




  Hypothesis Test   
      Lower Upper Wald Chi-Square Sig. 
(Intercept) 3.149 0.0472 3.057 3.242 4449.929 0 
[FiscalYearsDaysDum=0] 0.199 0.0267 0.147 0.251 55.697 0 
[FiscalYearsDaysDum=1] 0a . . . . . 
[Division=1.0] 0.073 0.0355 0.004 0.143 4.25 0.039 
[Division=2.0] 0.08 0.0309 0.019 0.14 6.665 0.01 
[Division=3.0] 0.338 0.0271 0.285 0.391 155.333 0 
[Division=4.0] 0.484 0.0297 0.426 0.542 266.015 0 
[Division=5.0] 0.14 0.0284 0.084 0.195 24.316 0 
[Division=6.0] 0.206 0.0331 0.141 0.27 38.463 0 
[Division=7.0] 0.001 0.0293 -0.057 0.058 0.001 0.978 
[Division=8.0] 0.122 0.0441 0.035 0.208 7.589 0.006 
[Division=9.0] 0a . . . . . 
[DumChain=0] -0.02 0.0152 -0.05 0.01 1.769 0.183 
[DumChain=1] 0a . . . . . 
[ControlNew=1.00] 0.093 0.0383 0.018 0.168 5.902 0.015 
[ControlNew=2.00] -0.217 0.0361 -0.288 -0.146 36.065 0 
[ControlNew=3.00] 0a . . . . . 
OverallRating2011 0.006 0.0006 0.005 0.007 102.417 0 
StaffingRating2011 0.001 0.0005 0 0.002 5.714 0.017 
 
 
H6: Nursing homes with higher quality ratings will report higher Medicare census 
than those with lower quality ratings.   
The omnibus tests revealed that the corresponding model outperformed the 
intercept model (p < 0.05) for each year between 2010-2012. Also, for each year of the 
study, each set of variables had a statistically significant effect in the model, including the 
overall quality rating, staffing, type of ownership, chain status and census divisions (p < 
0.05). Tables 24-26 shows that the estimated coefficient for quality ratings was found to 
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be positive and statistically significant (p < 0.05) for all three years of the study. Nursing 
homes with higher quality ratings were positively associated with higher Medicare census 
between 2010-2012. 
Table 24: 2010 Parameter Estimates with Medicare Census as Dependent 
Variable 
       






  Hypothesis Test   
      Lower Upper Wald Chi-Square Sig. 
(Intercept) -2.379 0.0373 -2.452 -2.306 4067.275 0 
[FiscalYearsDaysDum=0] -0.067 0.0215 -0.109 -0.025 9.833 0.002 
[FiscalYearsDaysDum=1] 0a . . . . . 
[Division=1.0] -0.177 0.0284 -0.233 -0.122 38.891 0 
[Division=2.0] -0.171 0.0249 -0.22 -0.122 47.118 0 
[Division=3.0] 0.079 0.0219 0.036 0.122 13.006 0 
[Division=4.0] -0.311 0.0241 -0.358 -0.263 165.774 0 
[Division=5.0] 0.102 0.0227 0.058 0.147 20.351 0 
[Division=6.0] 0.024 0.0267 -0.029 0.076 0.777 0.378 
[Division=7.0] 0.053 0.0237 0.007 0.1 5.059 0.025 
[Division=8.0] 0.019 0.0359 -0.051 0.09 0.295 0.587 
[Division=9.0] 0a . . . . . 
[DumChain=0] -0.051 0.0124 -0.076 -0.027 17.136 0 
[DumChain=1] 0a . . . . . 
[ControlNew=1.00] 0.296 0.0311 0.235 0.357 90.99 0 
[ControlNew=2.00] 0.426 0.0294 0.368 0.484 209.374 0 
[ControlNew=3.00] 0a . . . . . 
OverallRating2009 0.023 0.0046 0.014 0.032 24.637 0 
StaffingRating2009 0.007 0.0004 0.006 0.008 251.521 0 
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Table 25: 2011 Parameter Estimates with Medicare Census as Dependent 
Variable 
              




  Hypothesis Test   
      Lower Upper Wald Chi-Square Sig. 
(Intercept) -2.373 0.0381 -2.447 -2.298 3880.102 0 
[FiscalYearsDaysDum=0] -0.038 0.0219 -0.081 0.005 3.05 0.081 
[FiscalYearsDaysDum=1] 0a . . . . . 
[Division=1.0] -0.088 0.0289 -0.145 -0.031 9.272 0.002 
[Division=2.0] -0.059 0.0253 -0.109 -0.009 5.44 0.02 
[Division=3.0] 0.075 0.0221 0.032 0.118 11.496 0.001 
[Division=4.0] -0.298 0.0244 -0.346 -0.25 149.075 0 
[Division=5.0] 0.129 0.023 0.084 0.175 31.77 0 
[Division=6.0] 0.02 0.027 -0.033 0.073 0.54 0.463 
[Division=7.0] 0.062 0.0241 0.015 0.109 6.594 0.01 
[Division=8.0] 0.11 0.0361 0.039 0.181 9.289 0.002 
[Division=9.0] 0a . . . . . 
[DumChain=0] -0.075 0.0125 -0.099 -0.05 35.681 0 
[DumChain=1] 0a . . . . . 
[ControlNew=1.00] 0.268 0.0313 0.207 0.329 73.342 0 
[ControlNew=2.00] 0.412 0.0297 0.354 0.47 192.586 0 
[ControlNew=3.00] 0a . . . . . 
OverallRating2010 0.004 0.0005 0.003 0.005 58.797 0 
StaffingRating2010 0.006 0.0004 0.005 0.007 175.53 0 
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Table 26: 2012 Parameter Estimates with Medicare Census as Dependent 
Variable 
              




  Hypothesis Test   
      Lower Upper Wald Chi-Square Sig. 
(Intercept) 2.1 0.0398 2.022 2.178 2785.727 0 
[FiscalYearsDaysDum=0] -0.058 0.0225 -0.102 -0.014 6.632 0.01 
[FiscalYearsDaysDum=1] 0a . . . . . 
[Division=1.0] -0.228 0.0302 -0.288 -0.169 57.348 0 
[Division=2.0] -0.178 0.0263 -0.229 -0.126 45.65 0 
[Division=3.0] 0.02 0.023 -0.025 0.065 0.759 0.384 
[Division=4.0] -0.41 0.0255 -0.46 -0.36 259.187 0 
[Division=5.0] 0.089 0.024 0.042 0.136 13.845 0 
[Division=6.0] -0.048 0.0281 -0.103 0.007 2.962 0.085 
[Division=7.0] -0.005 0.0249 -0.054 0.044 0.035 0.852 
[Division=8.0] 0.038 0.0374 -0.036 0.111 1.02 0.312 
[Division=9.0] 0a . . . . . 
[DumChain=0] -0.049 0.013 -0.074 -0.024 14.259 0 
[DumChain=1] 0a . . . . . 
[ControlNew=1.00] 0.319 0.0324 0.256 0.383 96.9 0 
[ControlNew=2.00] 0.431 0.0308 0.371 0.491 196.067 0 
[ControlNew=3.00] 0a . . . . . 
OverallRating2011 0.003 0.0005 0.002 0.004 33.008 0 
StaffingRating2011 0.008 0.0005 0.007 0.009 313.566 0 
 
Summary of Support/ Lack of Support of Hypotheses 
Table 27 summarizes the results from the regressions that measured the 
relationship between quality rating performance on NHC and revenues, total operating 
expenses, operating profit margin, occupancy, Medicare census and private payor census. 
The information in the table provides evidence that there is an association between 
quality rating performance on Nursing Home Compare (NHC) and financial performance 
in nursing homes. The findings of this study revealed that high quality was correlated to 
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lower operating expenses, higher occupancy (over the latter two years of the study), 
private payor census and higher Medicare census, as evidenced in previous literature 
(Weech-Maldonado, Neff & Mor, 2003; Hicks et al., 2004; Castle, 2005; Park, Konetzka 
& Werner, 2011). This study did not find that high quality was associated with higher 
operating profit margins, which is not consistent with previous literature (Weech-
Maldonado, Neff & Mor, 2003; Park & Werner, 2010; Park, Konetzka & Werner, 2011). 
Table 27: Summary of Hypothesis Findings 
Hypotheses: Results: 
    2010 2011 2012 
H1: Nursing homes with higher quality 
ratings will report higher net 
resident revenues than those with 
lower quality ratings. 
Supported Not Supported Not Supported 
H2: Nursing homes with higher quality 
ratings will report lower total 
operating expenses than those with 
lower quality ratings. 
Supported Supported Supported 
H3: Nursing homes with higher quality 
ratings will report higher operating 
profit margins than those with lower 
quality ratings. 
Not Supported Not Supported Not Supported 
H4: Nursing homes with higher quality 
ratings will report higher occupancy 
than those with lower quality 
ratings. 
Not Supported Supported Supported 
H5: Nursing homes with higher quality 
ratings will report higher private 
payor census than those with lower 
quality ratings. 
Supported Supported Supported 
H6: Nursing homes with higher quality 
ratings will report higher Medicare 
census than those with lower quality 
ratings. 
Supported Supported Supported 
 
Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to determine the relationship between quality 
ratings as measured by Nursing Home Compare (NHC) performance and financial 
performance. It is important to explore this relationship because financial distress may 
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disrupt resident care or lead to nursing home closure, jeopardizing access to nursing 
home care and services (Castle, 2005). Sustaining a quality improvement program can be 
challenging for nursing homes with limited resources. With evidence that there is an 
association in high-quality ratings on Nursing Home Compare (NHC) and financial 
performance, operators will have additional incentive to continue to invest in quality 
improvement programs. 
Limitations 
This analysis was subject to several limitations. It was assumed that there is a 
causal pathway between nursing home quality and financial performance, but this is not 
known for certain. In terms of the counterfactual model for causal inferences (Shadish, 
Cook, & Campbell, 2002), it is unclear what the impact of the Five-Star Quality Rating 
System would be on financial performance for the same nursing homes if the system had 
not been implemented. Although there is financial data in the year prior to 
implementation, it is plausible that nursing homes would improve on financial 
performance simply as a function of time (cf. maturation in Shadish et al., 2002). Clearly, 
having a control group that is similar to the nursing homes used in the present study, but 
without the Five-Star Quality Rating System, would help to bolster inferences regarding 
the causal effect of the system on financial performance. Regarding temporal precedence, 
the assumed causal direction could be reversed (Shadish et al., 2002). That is, it is 
plausible that nursing homes that perform well financially would tend to achieve higher 
quality ratings.  
It is also unknown whether providers strive to achieve high NHC ratings to 
improve financial performance. High-quality ratings could be reflective of nursing home 
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operators cherry-picking residents for admission that would likely have better outcomes 
and/or deliberately investing in only those quality measures that drive the NHC ratings. 
NHC ratings may not, therefore, reflect the most comprehensive assessment of quality.  
Only freestanding nursing homes included on NHC (Medicare-certified) were 
examined. Hospital-based nursing homes or those not included on NHC may yield 
varying results due to differences in payor mix, ownership, staff and resident severity.  
The analysis was limited to nursing homes that filed Medicare Cost Reports and 
those featured on NHC during the study period. The analysis is limited to the 4-year time 
period between 2009-2012, but a longer time period may be needed to determine if the 
results for quality ratings and financial performance are robust. 
Although the study controlled for results between census divisions, competition at 
the county or zip codes levels may have had a greater impact on market share and 
occupancy and, therefore, financial performance. 
While the data on NHC are the most widely accepted quality measures, there are 
other (unmeasured) QM's not addressed by this study that may have a significant effect 
on financial performance, such as staff turnover, activities programming and resident 
satisfaction. Nursing home charges for private pay residents vary substantially which may 
impact resident choice in selecting a provider, but this analysis does not include prices. 
This study examines whether quality improvement results in financial gains, but it does 
not explore the influences of resident choice, family or responsible party, hospital 
discharge planners, insurance status, location/convenience of the nursing home or 
physician recommendations. These limitations may limit the generalizability of the 
findings. 
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Implications for Future Research 
The findings of this study open the door for future research, as this is the first 
documented study to examine the quality-financial performance relationship since the 
implementation of the Five-Star Quality Rating System on NHC. Some of the results of 
this study were consistent with previous literature (relationship between high-quality and 
lower total operating expenses, occupancy, private payor census, and Medicare census), 
but others were not (no correlation found between high-quality and higher revenues or 
higher operating profit margin). 
This study provided a more comprehensive definition of quality than previous 
literature by utilizing the overall quality rating from NHC. This rating accounts for 
process, outcomes, and structural quality by grading performance in health inspections, 
staffing, and quality measures. However, further research is needed to include other 
measures of quality that are not included in NHC, including resident satisfaction and staff 
turnover.  
More research is needed to further examine the relationship between nursing 
home quality and operating profit margins. This study found that high quality was 
correlated to lower expenses and higher market share, but the correlations between 
quality and revenues, as well as quality and operating profit margin were not supported. 
One would assume that higher market share, especially for private payor and Medicare, 
would lead to greater revenue. Additional research should examine the impact of private 
payor rates and pricing. Also, further research is needed to determine whether nursing 
homes that achieve high quality are cherry-picking prospective residents that require less 
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care or lower-costing care, resulting in lower revenue and higher Medicare or private 
payor market share. 
Future research should explore the causality in the quality-financial performance 
relationship more in depth for low-quality nursing homes and those that have worsened in 
quality over time. Slimmer profit margins associated with low quality could further 
exacerbate the challenges of operating with limited resources and lead to poor outcomes, 
greater regulatory noncompliance, and increased financial distress in nursing homes. This 
future research is necessary to determine the financial performance thresholds for low-
quality nursing homes that may indicate the likelihood of nursing home closures.  
There are currently no longitudinal studies on the relationship between public 
report cards and financial performance in nursing homes. Longitudinal studies are needed 
to take a closer look at causality between the quality-financial relationship. 
Implications for Nursing Home Operators 
This study also provides evidence that nursing home operators that invest in 
quality improvement can expect a return on investment by way of increased market share, 
even if incremental levels, and not the highest level, of quality are achieved. Moreover, 
by analyzing the beta coefficients in the results of this study, it was found that for each 
star that a nursing home increases in overall quality ratings (and all other variables 
constant), the expected results are a decrease in total operating expenses by an 
exponential multiplicative factor of .002, an increase in occupancy by an exponential 
multiplicative factor of .002, an increase in private payor census by an exponential 
multiplicative factor of .006, and an increase in Medicare census by an exponential 
multiplicative factor of .002. 
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Given the findings of this study on the correlation between quality and private 
payor census, nursing home operators should consider increasing private payor rates to 
increase revenue. Prospective private payor residents have been found to shop for higher 
quality and may be more likely to pay for higher quality.  
By achieving higher quality, nursing home operators would attract both private 
payor and Medicare residents. By attracting more prospective residents, nursing home 
operators will be privileged with the ability to cherry-pick prospective residents that 
require less care or those with lower costs of care.  
Policy Implications 
Despite the limitations of this study, the results provide important implications for 
policymakers. With the evolution of the policy, nursing homes have shown consistent 
improvements in quality year after year. It was also found that NHC has been effective as 
a quality improvement policy that incentivizes high-quality performance. However, the 
findings also reveal the potential for a negative consequence of the policy where a greater 
wedge may be driven between high- and low-quality nursing homes. The results of this 
study find that those with high-quality performance ratings on NHC are, in fact, able to 
attract more Medicare and private payor residents. Low-quality nursing homes, on the 
other hand, are more likely to provide care to more Medicaid residents for which they 
would receive the lowest reimbursement rate for services provided. As a result, low-
quality nursing homes would experience greater challenges to be able to afford to 
maintain adequate resources to provide quality care (i.e. staffing, supplies and 
equipment). Without the affordability to invest in quality improvement, low-quality 
nursing homes would have the looming threat of nursing home closure, which may 
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ultimately lead to furthering disparities by decreasing accessibility to nursing home care. 
As nursing home report cards continue to evolve, policymakers should be conscientious 
of these implications to ensure that low-quality nursing homes have the necessary 
resources to improve quality of care.  
This study found that high-quality nursing homes report lower total operating 
expenses, but no correlation was found between quality and revenues. Future research is 
needed to examine the latter relationship and the differences in resident acuity between 
high- and low-quality nursing homes. The peculiarity of results of this study leave room 
for speculation that NHC as a policy may also yield the negative consequence of leaving 
the most acute and costly residents for lower quality nursing homes. If this is so, the 
lowest quality nursing homes may be forced out of business by their higher-achieving 
competitors, as they would likely not be able to afford to provide care to the indigent. The 
negative outcomes of NHC as quality improvement tool would include the increased risk 
of the nation’s poorest and most-dependent seniors having to resort to the worst nursing 
homes for care, or experiencing lack of access to nursing home care due to closure. 
Recommendations for Policymakers 
 The findings of this study indicate that NHC is effective in driving market share. 
High-quality nursing homes attract and admit more prospective residents with the highest 
reimbursement (Medicare or private payor). Low-quality nursing homes, on the other 
hand, have higher populations of residents with inadequate or no healthcare coverage. As 
a result, low-quality nursing homes face a greater challenge to maintain financial viability 
and a higher risk of nursing home closure under the policy. A nursing home that is not 
able to maintain overall census or a healthy payor mix may not be able to make the 
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continued investment in quality improvement. It is recommended that policymakers 
develop a means to ensure that the less competitive, low-quality nursing homes have the 
necessary resources to improve quality of care. To minimize the risk of low-quality 
nursing homes folding financially and to also minimize the risk of lack of access to 
nursing home services for the indigent, policymakers should implement a reimbursement 
rate adjustment for nursing homes that care for a high percentage of indigent residents 
with inadequate or no healthcare coverage. Also, state health policies should be advanced 
to mirror the efforts of NHC to subsidize the care of residents that are highly acute and 
costly with an adjusted reimbursement rate, based on case-mix. To ensure that low-
quality nursing homes continue to invest in quality, the rate adjustments should be 
contingent on performance. Nursing homes should receive performance-based 
reimbursement if quality outcomes are achieved, based on evidence-based thresholds. 
The effectiveness of NHC as a policy is dependent on utilization by consumers to 
make a selection for a nursing home. Nursing home report cards have evolved over the 
thirteen years since initial publication to improve user-friendliness and usefulness, but the 
literature does not show that the web site is fully utilized in the long-term care 
community. Policymakers should be cognizant of ways to continuously promote and 
encourage the use of NHC. It is recommended that policymakers incentivize hospitals for 
collaborating with nursing homes to increase NHC utilization through shared 
accountability. Hospitals should be encouraged and incentivized for being a key 
stakeholder involved in not only referring and discharging patients from hospitals to 
nursing homes, but also making sure that patients (or their responsible parties) are well-
informed on NHC quality ratings and data for each of the different nursing homes. For 
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example, hospital personnel should educate patients on NHC data and refer a patient to 
nursing homes within a specific geographic area that have high quality ratings. If the 
accountability is shared between the two healthcare settings, NHC will be more widely 
utilized, patients will be more informed of report cards and quality ratings, and the 
competition on quality between nursing homes may continue to increase. 
Further policy development should ensue to offer a more comprehensive measure 
of quality and increased value to consumers. Policymakers should solicit the 
input/feedback of prospective residents, their responsible parties and case 
managers/discharge planners to determine what additional measures can be added to 
NHC to increase value, such as customer satisfaction survey scores and staff retention 
rates. 
Currently nursing home report cards can only be accessed online and in English. 
Policymakers should increase utilization of NHC by identifying ways to educate seniors 
who are computer illiterate or lack Internet access, as well as those who speak a language 
other than Spanish. Nursing home report card information should also be distributed in 
alternative forms, such as via a routine printed publication. 
Conclusions 
 Since the implementation of nursing home report cards, many nursing home 
operators have wondered whether high quality nursing homes ratings have better 
financial performance. Several studies have attempted to examine the direct and indirect 
incentives for quality improvement investments and achieving or maintaining high 
quality under nursing home report cards. As discussed in the literature review, the results 
are mixed. In the interest of contributing to the literature regarding the question, this 
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study was designed to determine the relationship between quality rating performance on 
NHC and financial performance in nursing homes.  
 A thorough review of the literature showed that NHC performance had a 
significant relationship with higher quality, lower costs and greater profit. However, the 
literature was inconclusive on the relationship between NHC performance and revenues, 
occupancy, and Medicare and private payor market share. Using secondary data from 
Nursing Home Compare and Medicare Cost Reports, this study evaluated the overall 
quality rating and financial performance of 14,015 – 14,265 nursing homes between 
2009-2012 (sample varied per year). Generalized linear models indicated an association 
high quality rating performance on NHC and financial performance. Specifically, it was 
found that high-quality ratings were correlated to lower total operating expenses, higher 
occupancy (for the last two years of the study), higher private payor census, and higher 
Medicare census. 
 The findings of this study are significant as the utilization of NHC by prospective 
nursing home residents continues to increase, and nursing home operators are 
increasingly investing in quality improvement. Realizing the limitations and the policy 
implications of the findings of this study makes way for future research of the hypotheses 
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